On 10 April 1998, the so-called Good Friday Agreement (or the Belfast Agreement) was signed. This agreement helped to put an end to a period of conflict in the region, described as unrest. Three new institutions were defined in the agreement: the agreement was reached after many years of complex discussions, proposals and compromises. A lot of people have contributed a lot. Tony Blair and Bertie Ahern were then leaders of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. The talks were led by US Special Envoy George Mitchell.  For some, the dominant image and, in a way, the crowned moment of the peace process in Northern Ireland, is that of Ian Paisley, the loyalist politician and Protestant religious leader who, alongside former IRA leader Martin McGuiness, laughs and smiles after becoming colleagues. Even we, when we signed the agreement in 1998, when Paisley had “treason and treason” at the gates, we could not have dared to imagine that Paisley would be the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland and McGuinness Prime Minister a decade later. Sinn Féin`s Máirtín Ó Muilleoir said the promise of the deal had not been kept. “Northern Ireland is now in a better place than it was twenty years ago, for sure, but we still have a long way to go and the shortcomings of the agreement that were not addressed at the time still need to be addressed.” “He didn`t see the end of paramilitarism, he didn`t see the promised political stability that heralded the deal, and here we are 20 years after the deal without a government,” he said.
For Brexit, it`s time to do the same; Elevate the discussion beyond individual interests at the collective level, broaden the definition of us and reduce the definition of those. It`s also time to be brutally honest about the real decisions and their consequences. There is no variant of Brexit that could strengthen relations between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. There is no variant of Brexit that will allow the UK economy to grow in the near future. Brexit, especially a no-deal Brexit with the risk of a hard border, is both the biggest threat to the Good Friday Agreement since its inception and to the Union in our lifetime. It is time to recognize the reality of these challenges and work together to overcome them. This is our conviction, or certainly certainly, our fervent hope that the Good Friday Agreement will survive Brexit. In a context of political violence during the unrest, the agreement committed participants to “exclusively democratic and peaceful ways to resolve disputes over political issues.” This took into account two aspects: the variation of the Brexit agreements that have been discussed and the immensity of the Brexit promises of 2016 are so great that it is unlikely that a deal is what public opinion voted for.
The British people should have the last word. They should be asked whether, now that they know everything they are doing, they want to continue, on whatever basis, the government and parliament. These institutional arrangements, which have been established in these three areas, are defined in the agreement as “interdependent and interdependent”. In particular, it is found that the functioning of the Northern Ireland Assembly and the North-South Council of Ministers is “so closely linked that the success of the other depends on the success of the other”, and that participation in the North-South Council of Ministers is “one of the essential tasks related to the relevant posts in [Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland]”. .